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The purpose of this thesis is to examine government
contractor stock trading activity prior to contract award
announcements to determine if insider information inequalities
may have occurred. When irregularity is identified the thesis
will examine possible causes for the abnormal behavior. The
methodology provided in the thesis may provide a basis for
future SEC or Department of Defense investigations into
possible illegal insider trading patterns within the defense
industries.
B . BACKGROUND
Defense contract awards are often very lucrative and very
important to a defense firm's future profits. Therefore,
information on pending contract awards can be very valuable.
Individuals possessing award information prior to its public
release may be tempted to use it if the opportunity presents
itself.
Through stock trading patterns the thesis will identify
possible abnormal returns and trading irregularities prior to
the contract award announcements. It might be expected that
insiders could illegally purchase or sell stock prior to the
announcement of a very favorable contract award. A previous
study illustrated that an ever increasing volatility and
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appreciation on the stock of a major aerospace company-
occurred as a major contract award for aircraft went through
the various congressional sub- committees . This increased
activity appeared to be the result of information leakage
about the pending contract award. (Interview, Parker, 1992)
Analysis of the trading prior to the release of contract
award announcements, may suggest the location of leaks in the
information channel. Today the rules for announcing contract
awards are specifically spelled out and strictly enforced.
(Czech, 1989, p. 3) Some of the more important rules and
regulations include the following:
1. The contract announcement is sent from the contracting
agency to the Congressional Liaison Office;
2. Publication of this announcement is processed through
the Public Affairs Office at the Pentagon and;
3. The contract award is announced at 4:00 p.m. Eastern
Standard Time (EST) to coincide with the close of the
New York Stock Exchange for that day. (Code of Federal
Regulations, 5303(a), p. 51)
The timeframe for this process is often unique to the
contract, but generally happens within a three day window.
Abnormal price change prior to these announcements may provide
evidence of insider information being used.
Considerable research has been done to determine the
extent of insider trading. The research has tested trading
strategies based on the trades of registered insiders during
normal transactions as well as tracking the returns of
insiders prior to various events. Very little specific
research has been done on the defense industries, however.
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Previous research seems to have focused on registered
insiders. The defense contracting process is very complex and
represents a much larger group of participants than the few
regulated insiders that would be associated with a single
corporation. Therefore the opportunity to benefit from non-
public information is greater.
C. OBJECTIVE
The primary objective of the thesis is to examine the
stock trading prior to the contract award to determine if any
irregular activity is caused by trading on inside information.
Secondary objectives are to establish possible explana-
tions for the irregularity along with any ethical or material
concerns.
D. RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESIS
1. Primary Research Question
Do defense industry non-registered insiders appear to
be trading on non-public information to earn above average
returns based on contract awards?
The primary research question investigated in this
thesis can be restated as the following research hypothesis:
Defense industry insiders trade on non-public information
to earn above average returns based on contract awards.














= rate of return on S&P 500 index.
2. Subsidiary Research Questions
a. Does the company stock trading leading up to the
contract have significant price changes?
b. Is there a readily available explanation to explain any
significant price change?
c. What ethical and material concerns are there in relation
to the increased trading with non-public information?
E. SCOPE OF THESIS
The thesis will examine four companies involved in defense




3. Aetna Life and Casualty
4. Tadiran
The thesis will look for any irregular activity in the
stocks of these companies leading up to the contract award.
The investigation of recent data will help capture the
financial atmosphere surrounding the companies at the time of
the award and provide current results which can be used by
interested parties.
Within the context of this thesis, insiders will be
defined as those who have access to the non-public information
of the contract award. Registered insiders will be the term
used for the insiders employed by the firm with ten percent or
higher shareholdings.
F. METHODOLOGY
The methodology that was followed was partially obtained
from two previous insider trading studies. The first Moss
(1986) , looked at a variety of issues regarding insider
trading around corporate announcements including government
contract awards. The second, Czech (1989) , looked at the
trading of registered insiders in and around defense contract
awards within the defense industry between 1980 and 1987.
Additionally, a literature search was conducted on all
insider related research done within the last 30 years.
Fiscal year 1993 defense contract awards were screened
using the Wall Street Journal Index along with various issues
of Defense News . Companies were selected based on being
publicly traded and having a contract award or loss represent-
ing at least 15 percent of prior year revenue.
The firm's stock price data for the 30 days leading up to
the contract award was closely scrutinized. The analysis
focused on any abnormal price change using the Capital Asset
Pricing Model as the measuring tool. (Jacob and Pettit,
1984, p. 321)
If abnormal returns exist, all news related items will be
investigated to find possible explanations. After thorough
research is accomplished, conclusions will be developed to
explain possible causes for the abnormal returns including
trading based on inside information.
6. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter II provides
the background of insider trading within the defense industry
and also an overview of insider trading in general. It
provides a defense industry overview and additionally looks at
the Efficient Market Hypothesis and the Securities and
Exchange Commission responsibilities.
Chapter III discusses the insider related issues derived
from the literature review. Chapter IV discusses the method-
ology used to gather the data.
Chapter V presents and analyzes the data for each of the
companies along with providing conclusions specific to each
firm.
Chapter VI provides a summary of the research effort.
Resultant conclusions are stated and recommendations,
concerning the use of the research data, are made. Finally,
a list of areas for further research is provided.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. INTRODUCTION
Insider trading is a critical issue in the market today.
The market's mechanics can be and are affected by insiders in
various ways. Investors want markets that are reliable and
fairly reflect the market value of securities available for
investment. When there is important information that is non-
public, security prices will not reflect the true value of all
information known. This will lead to mispricing of securities
and the probability of some investors profiting over others
due to having this privileged inside information.
An important aspect of this thesis relates to the differ-
ences between government and corporate announcements. In
ordinary corporate announcements, the directors, officers, and
others will most likely be aware of important news and because
of this, there may be increased insider trading. In govern-
ment contract awards, the only people who know of the selected
contractor are members of the source selection team, congres-
sional committee members and staff, and others in the formal
approving chain of command.
B. INSIDER TRADING AND THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 defined a regis-
tered insider as, "any officer, director, or person who owns
more than 10% of a registered company." Some of the rules
from this act pertaining to this thesis are covered below.
1. SEC Rule 16a Insider Report Filing
Rule 16a requires insiders to file an initial report
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and must
file a report in any month where there are any changes in
their security holdings (Skousen, 1987, pp. 19-27) These
reports are published by the SEC in their Official Summary of
Security Transactions and Holdings Publication. Researcher's
use this publication extensively and it is available to the
general public. The insider must report any transaction
within 10 days of the month in which the securities were
transacted. The SEC reported that up to 45% of insider
filings to the SEC were late. (Czech, 1989, p. 22)
2. SEC Rule 16b Short Term Sale Recoupment
Rule 16b allows a corporation to recover gains on
short term sales of stocks by insiders. A short term sale is
a holding period of less than six months. This provides a
mechanism for the SEC and corporations to deter frequent short
term transactions by insiders trying to take advantage of non-
public information.
3. SEC Rule io-5b inside Information Disclosure
Rule 10-5b aids the SEC in prosecuting insiders by
prohibiting "any person from engaging in security transactions
on the basis of inside information without prior disclosure."
This rule applies to all persons; not just registered
insiders. These three rules facilitate the SEC in prohibiting
illegal security transactions.
In 1984, the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 was
passed increasing the penalties for illegal insider trading.
It provided the SEC with the ability to triple the fines on
insiders and also increased criminal penalties from $10,000 to
$100,000. However, the legislation still did not define
"material inside information" or who an insider was (Skousen,
1987, p. 35) .
In November of 1988, President Reagan signed into law,
the latest bill to curb insider trading. This bill substan-
tially increases the criminal penalties associated with
insider trading and provides for a maximum prison sentence of
ten years (Staff, 1988, p. A3). Additionally, the bill also
set up a bounty reward program for informants and also gave
investors in the market at the time of the illegal insider
trading, the right to take legal action against the insiders.
Though insider trading is not defined legally,
regulators utilize a concept that has developed over time
based on court decisions (Solodar, 1987, p. 24). This concept
consists of four main parts. The first part states insider
trading must involve advance, non-public information.
Secondly, the information used must provide profits to the
insider through the trading of securities. Thirdly, the
insider can either be the one who learned first-hand of the
information or the insider could be the tippee (a person
finding out information from an inside person) . Finally,
cases involving insider trading result in a compromise of
fiduciary responsibility (Solodar, 1987, p. 24). These parts
form the ingredients for insider trading.
C. INSIDER TRADING OVERVIEW
Insider trading has been around as long as financial
markets have existed. Mark Stevens (1987, p. 219) in his
book, The Insiders , states:
The truth is that although the Stock Exchanges, the SEC,
and the assorted watchdogs of the securities market prefer
to play this down, insider trading is a game for the
masses. Insiders at all levels aspire to play; many who
have the opportunity do. Unlike robbing a bank or
stealing a car, insider, trading is not generally viewed
as a crime.
Insiders range from secretaries, taxi-cab drivers, and
printers to the most prestigious of arbitrators, such as Ivan
Boesky (Russell, 1986, p. 71).
There are many views on whether insider trading is a
detriment to the marketplace. Young (1985, p. 180) argues
that insider trading is beneficial to the market and
investors. He supports arguments made by Henry Manne, a
strong critic of SEC regulations for many years. One argument
suggest insider trading promotes "entrepreneurial" activity
and is a way of compensating entrepreneurs. Another argument
proposes that insider trading makes the market more efficient
by impacting stock prices as early as possible. Therefore,
stock prices would fully reflect the value of all possible
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information. Young also suggests non-insiders can protect
themselves from insiders by buying and holding securities for
the long term thus reducing insider profits. (Young, 1985, p.
181)
The main opposition to insider trading focuses on the
impact to the investing public and the ability of the market
to raise capital for business. Everyone who invests wants
equal opportunity in the marketplace.
Huss-Leete (1988. p. 5) argue that the integrity of the
market is at risk unless insiders, found to be illegally
using, inside information for profit, are appropriately dealt
with. They believe there is a greater risk to the financial
system if action is not taken immediately.
There is a fundamental concern for market integrity when
dealing with insider trading. Arthur Levitt, Jr. , Former
Chairman of the American Stock Exchange states, "If the
investor thinks he's not getting a fair shake, he's not going
to invest, and that is going to hurt capital in the long run."
(Laderman, Glaberson, Marcial, Phillippe, Frank, 1985, p. 79)
Ludman (1986, p. 120) defends the regulation of insider
trading based on both ethical and economic consequences.
Ludman agrees with the SEC that insider trading is so close to
"fraud" that monitoring should be continued. (Ludman, 1986,
p. 121) He cites the jeopardizing of market liquidity and
confidence as plenty support for continued regulation.
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Douglas (1988, p. 129) demonstrated that damage does occur
in both good news and bad news situations. His argument
states the uninformed shareholder suffers when trading with
the insider who profits from their inside information.
Douglas argues this damage justifies the enforcement of
insider trading regulations. Douglas seeks "immediate
disclosure" as opposed to insider trading. Immediate
disclosure would provide instant access to the investing
public to the fact that insiders are involved in the trading
of the stock. In conclusion, Douglas states:
These uniformed stockholders have a clear right to the
information monopolized by insiders because the informa-
tion is generated with corporate funds. Insiders have no
special claim to the information because they have not
incurred any cost in generating it (Douglass, 1988, p.
137) .
While there are many views regarding insider trading
available, the general consensus appear to support that
trading on inside information is a detriment to the market-
place.
D. DEFENSE INDUSTRY OVERVIEW
The defense industry has a complex structure and unique
relationship to its markets. The industry has a small number
of firms most of which depend on the United States Government
for a large percentage of their sales. Winning a major
contract award determines the firms' future profitability and
stability and insiders would be inclined to watch these
developments very closely as large government contracts are
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not as common as they once were. (Burnett, 1987, p. 29) . The
complexity of the defense department can be seen in the
following quote.
The Department of Defense is the largest and most complex
organization in the world, employing more than three
million people, operating more than 5,600 installations
around the world, and executing more than 15 million
contracts per year with some 300,000 contractors.
(Preston, 1986, p. 1)
.
By any measure, the Department of Defense is big business.
Defense contractors experience different risks than those
of companies dealing largely with the corporate sector.
Additional risk and instability is present due to dependence
of the firm on Federal budgets and the whims of the President
and Congress. Defense programs and weapon systems can be cut
with very little notice often crippling the defense contrac-
tors and subcontractor associated with the program. Clearly,
many defense contractors rely on the defense industry with
defense sales accounting for a majority of their total
business.
Reductions in the defense budget, program cancellations or
severe curtailment can play havoc with a defense company's
future. Due to the volatility in the industry, the defense
contractor's stability and profitability from year to year can
be less predictable than the average company.
Due to the nature and complexity of the industry, there
are many chances for taking advantage of insider information.
Often the privileged information is of enormous magnitude due
to the large size and concentration of many of the defense
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contracts. The high dependence of defense companies maintain-
ing and getting new contracts increases the value of informa-
tion regarding the contract awards.
E. OVERVIEW OF THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS
The Efficient Market Hypothesis is fundamental to an
insider trading analysis. The following paragraphs summarize
this widely discussed theory.
Insider trading and the processing of information is
central to the theory of efficient capital markets. (Czech,
1989, p. 12) Eugene Fama (1970, p. 383) states, "A market in
which prices always * fully reflect' available information is
called efficient." This is known as the Efficient Market
Hypothesis (EMH) . Fama further delineates this theory into
three levels of efficiency. They are covered below.
1. Weak Form
Fama (1970, p. 387) describes the first level as the
"weak-form" wherein security prices reflect all past, histor-
ical data. This basically means that no investor can create
a profitable trading rule based on past information as this
information is already impounded in the security price. Most
of the research support the weak-form of the Efficient Market
Hypothesis.
2. Semi-Strong Form
The second level, "semi-strong form," states that all
past and public information is adjusted for in security
prices. This means that public announcements by corporations
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(i.e., earnings or dividend announcements) are quickly
impounded into the security price and consequently, abnormal
profits cannot be made. The research studies on the semi-
strong form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis have, for the
most part, supported the market at this efficiency level
(Fama, 1970, p. 409)
.
3. Strong Form
The last and third level of this theory is referred to
as the " strong- form. " This level states that stock prices
fully reflect all information known, public, private, and
historical (Fama, 1970, p. 383) . This essentially means that
no investor has information over which he or she can make





There has been a fair amount of research done on insider
trading and related area over the years . Most of the research
has focused on the strong- form efficient market hypothesis to
analyze whether or not insiders consistently realize abnormal
profits
.
One of the problems in researching the strong- form market
hypothesis is that inside information itself is unobservable.
Therefore, different methods must be used. One of the more
popular methods is to examine returns and trading volume prior
to public announcements (Dyckman & Morse, 1986, p. 40) . Price
and volume movement in the underlying stock can sometimes
demonstrate behavior consistent with insider trading.
B. DEFENSE RELATED STUDIES
A very similar thesis on insider trading within the
defense industry was done by Czech (19 89) . This study looked
at insider trading done within the defense industry between
1980 and 1987. The authors looked at the stock price and
volume activity surrounding a contract award announcement.
Only trade's by "registered" insiders were analyzed.
Additionally, the study focused on the industry as a whole
rather than each individual contract award. The conclusion of
the thesis was that only on Day "0" or the day of the public
16
award announcement were there statistically significant
abnormal returns and abnormal trading volume and hence insider
trading if done was not detected. (Czech, 1989, p. 106) . The
work generally supported semi-strong form market efficiency.
Blunt (1988) studied the effects of political and military
events on the prices of defense stocks. Blunt found that
certain military and political events did in fact produce
abnormal returns in the defense portfolio of stocks examined
(Czech, 1989, p. 10).
Moss (1986) looked at a variety of issues regarding
insider trading around major public corporate announcements.
One of the items researched was government contract awards.
Moss did not define them as "defense contracts," so it is
unclear as to the direct relation to the defense industry.
The study found that insiders earned abnormal returns from
purchases prior to the announcement of these favorable awards
and also reduced their losses on those trades prior to bad
news.
C. STRONG-FORM MARKET EFFICIENCY STUDIES
Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968, p. 35) did a comprehensive
study on the stock trading of insiders and its information
content for outsiders. The authors provided some of the first
evidence that "proper and prompt analysis of data on insider
trading can be profitable."
They looked at several insider trading properties to
determine their validity. Two of the properties analyzed were
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whether or not 1) insiders had superior ability to forecast
significant price changes in their own stock, and 2) intensive
buying or selling of stock by insiders indicated stock perfor-
mance six months later (intensive buying/selling event
requires have at least two more buyers than sellers and vice
versa)
.
After statistically analyzing insider stock transactions
before a major change (considered to be 8% or more) , the
authors found "the odds in favor of a large increase were 2 .
5
to 1 after an insider purchase and 1.1 to 1 after a sale"
(Lorie and Niederhoffer, 1968, p. 47). Other analyses provide
similar support that insiders can successfully predict large
price changes in their stocks.
Lorie and Niederhoffer also found when insiders do trade
extensively, the subsequent outcome will approximate the
trading (i.e.: if intensive buying, the stock price should
increase, and the stock price should decrease for intensive
selling) (Lorie and Niederhoffer, 1968, p. 51).
Pratt & DeVere did a massive review of 52,000 insider
transactions of 800 firms traded on the NYSE between 1960-
1966. The authors computed the "investment performance" of
both buy and sell groups. A buy group was considered to have
at least three insiders buying and no insiders selling and
vice-versa for the sell group." The average rate of return
for the buy group was 27.1% after 12 months and 9.6% for the
sell group (Pratt & DeVere, 1968, p. 272).
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Finnerty (1976, p. 1141) studied "the average insider"
which included any company in which and insider traded. He
concluded that insiders do make above average returns when
purchasing stock of their own companies and are also able to
reduce their losses when selling the stock (Finnerty, 1976, p.
1146) .
Keown and Pinkerton (1981, p. 857) looked at insider
trading around merger and takeover announcements. The authors
studied insiders other than "registered insiders" to determine
the activity levels of this group with reference to merger
events
.
The sample consisted of 194 successfully acquired firms of
which 101 were listed on the New York Stock Exchange and 93 in
the Over the Counter Market. The period of announcements
ranged from 1975 through 1978. Utilizing the market model and
daily stock prices, Keown and Pinkerton calculated both daily
and cumulative average residuals (CAR) . The results of Keown
and Pinkerton' s study revealed the CAR became positive 25 days
prior to the public announcement date and the daily average
residuals were positive 26 out of 27 days prior to this
announcement (Keown and Pinkerton, 1981, p. 860) . The authors
conclude the preponderance of insider trading prior to the
official public announcement date. Analyzing the increased
trading volume that was present, Keown and Pinkerton state:
In fact, 76% of the firms studied experienced no open
market purchases or sales by registered insiders during
the month prior to the announcement date .... Thus the
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frantic trading that occurred prior to the merger
announcement was not caused by registered insiders for
whom trades during this period would attract unwanted
attention (Keown and Pinkerton, 1981, p. 863) .
Keown and Pinkerton conclude registered insiders are not





The chapter is divided into three sections. In the first
section, the test procedure is presented. The second section
provides a detailed description of the data. Finally, the
third section presents the capital asset pricing model.
B. TEST PROCEDURE
The thesis will look at the stock price data from the
companies selected for the 30 days leading up to the contract
award. The average change in the price of the stock during
this 30-day period will be compared with the return of the
Standard and Poor's 500 Market Index for the same period.
Since the primary objective of this thesis is to determine if
insiders, presumed to be acting on the knowledge of nonpublic
information, are able to outperform the market, it was not
necessary to examine returns after the announcement effect was
complete. To investigate returns after the announcement
effect is exhausted would permit the influence of other
company and economic developments to cloud the results. The
isolation of excess returns (or lack of excess returns)
produced as a result of trading on the basis of inside
information should refute (or lend support to) the strong form
efficient market hypothesis.
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The insider's returns were adjusted for risk using beta
coefficients and compared with returns for the S&P 500 market
index via the capital asset pricing model. The magnitude of
the residual return (the excess return after adjustment for
risk over the return on the market index) should indicate
whether or not an insider was able to outperform the market
(after adjustments for risk)
.

























t = the number of days from the date of purchase or sale
to the day for which the return is to be computed;
R
m
= the equivalent annual return on the market index;
R. = the equivalent annual return on security i after t
days
;
P = the security price at 30 days prior to announcement;
P
t
= the security price after 30 days;
MQ = the market index at 30 days prior to announcement;
M
t
= the market index after 30 days.
This methodology enables returns over differing holding
periods to be standardized at an equivalent rate of return.
The annualized return for each transaction was computed for
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the 30 days leading up to the announcement as well as an
annualized return for the market during the same period.
As Jensen has indicated in a previous study, the capital
asset pricing model can be revised into the following
regression (Jensen, 1968, pp. 398-416):
R
}
- i = A. + (Beta) (1^, - i) + U. (4.3)
where
:
A. = the excess return by the insider above the return on
the market
U- = the error term with an expected value equal to zero
Table 4-1 shows the data used in a sample calculation of
returns. The table is followed by an illustration of the
precise manner in which return calculations were performed.
TABLE 4-1
EXAMPLE OF RETURN CALCULATIONS IN THE STUDY






















Assume there were two other insider transactions with
returns of .92 and 1.00 while the market return was .44 and
.52 over the same time periods. The average return on the
security would be .96 and the average market return would be
.48. The excess return on the insiders' transactions could
then be calculated as follows:
.96 - .10 = Aj + (.48 - .10) (1.5) +
.86 = Aj + .57
Aj = .29
The return on the stock is 96 percent while the return on
the market is 48 percent. After the stock is adjusted for
risk the excess return is 29 percent. The excess return was
then tested to determine if it was statistically significant
from zero. Any value of Aj significantly different from zero
is an indicator of excess returns since Aj should be zero in
an efficient market, i.e., a random selection of stocks can be
expected to result in a zero intercept using Jensen's method-
ology shown above. If insiders are able to use private
information and forecast security price changes, the intercept
should be significantly different from zero. The paired
differences test was used to test for significance at the
ninety five percent level of confidence.
If abnormal returns are found, other possible causes for
the abnormal returns will be investigated. The following
represents other possible causes to be examined:
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1. All news during the period.
2. Any registered insider transactions.
3. Brokerage House rating or earning estimate changes.
4. Other related companies stock movement.
5. Earning announcements.
Any reasonable explanation for abnormal movement will be
sought out. If no rational explanation can be found, then the
stock award information flow process will be examined for the
possibility of trading or inside information.
C. STOCK PRICE DATA
The stock price and volume data for the stock sample was
taken from the online Dow Jones Historical Stock Quote
Reporter Service of the online Dow Jones News Retrieval
Service . The price and volume data were looked at for the 90
days leading up to the contract award.
The Wall Street Journal Index was researched for companies
that were awarded defense contracts. The companies were
selected based on the award size impacting revenue by at least
15%. This made the contract award very material to the
company. The companies selected were chosen at random from a
sample of companies meeting the above requirements.
Corporate historical betas used in the capital asset
pricing model were taken from Reality's Smart Investor Online
Software Program . This service provides historical betas as
well as other fundamental information on over 5000 publicly
25
traded corporations. The betas used for this study were
calculated to be effective as of June 1993.
D. CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL
The capital asset pricing model was originally developed
by William F. Sharpe in 1964 and independently by John Lintner
in 1965. Many generalizations of the theory were made after
its introduction. However, the most significant was made by
Jan Mossin in 1966. For these reasons, the theory is often
called the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin Capital Asset Pricing Model
(Jacob and Pettit, 1984, p. 321). The model provides a
simple, but powerful, description of the relationship between
risk and return in an efficient market. It also serves as the
basis for a number of current practices in the investment
industry
.
Although other theories attempt to do the same thing, the
capital asset pricing model is especially useful for two
reasons. First, since the model is relatively simple and
intuitive, it can easily be applied. Second, its implications
have been researched extensively using empirical data and
found to be substantially consistent with most of the theory's
predictions. While the theory does not always predict
correctly, its implications generally conform to what is
observed in security markets. (Sharpe, 1985, pp. 146-179)
The important assumptions in the capital asset pricing
model are summarized as follows: (Jacob and Pettit, pp. 321-
358)
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1. No transactions costs or taxes are included.
2
.
Investors may hold fractional shares of individual
stocks
.
3. All investors are price takers.
4. A single investment period in an uncertain world.
5. Investors make decisions on the basis of portfolio
expected returns and standard deviations of returns.
6. Expectations are homogeneous.
7. A risk-free asset exists, available to all for borrowing
or lending.
The capital asset pricing model is expressed as follows:
E(R-) = i + [E(RJ - i] [Beta] (4.4)
where:
E(R) = the expected rate of return on security j;
i = the risk free rate of return;
£(1^) = the expected return on the market index;
Beta = the beta coefficient for security j
.
The risk free rate of return refers to the interest rate
on securities that are free of default risk. The most
appropriate choice of a risk free asset is a U.S. Treasury
security, since government securities are perhaps the safest
of all possible investments. The maturity of the Treasury
security used should be approximately the same as the
investor's holding period. If an investor has a five year
holding period, the rate on a five year Treasury security
should be used as the risk free rate of return. (Gup, 1984,
p. 134) The risk free rate of return used in this study was
the average rate of return on new issues of 90-day Treasury
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bills taken within the month of the announcement. These rates
are readily available from the Dow Jones News Retrieval
Service. A list of the rates are shown in Appendix A.
The Standard and Poor's 500 Stock Index was used as a
proxy for the market portfolio. The index includes 400
industrial, 40 public utility, 20 transportation, and 40
financial companies. The index was assigned a value of 10 for
the base period of 1941-43. (Gup, 1984, p. 145) Therefore,
if the Standard and Poor's 500 Stock Index were 150 today, the
value of the 500 stocks would be 15 times greater than it was
during the 1941-43 base period. Values for the Standard and
Poor's 500 Index that were used in this thesis were taken from
the online Dow Jones Historical Stock Quote Reporter Service.
The beta coefficient is a measure of the volatility in the
return of an asset relative to a market portfolio of assets.
In theory, the market portfolio consists of all risky assets
that are available to investors. In practice, however, a
large portfolio of common stocks, such as the Standard and
Poor's 500, is often used to represent the market portfolio.
(Jacob and Pettit, 1985, p. 326)
Beta is a commonly used measure of systematic risk, i.e.,
risk that is common to all stocks in the market. This is the
risk that is due to inflation or changes in general business
conditions that affect all stocks in the market. The beta for
the market is always 1.00. The beta for an individual
security is usually measured by comparing the variations in
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returns of the security to the returns on the market port-
folio. The calculated beta coefficient may then be used as an
aid to investors to determine the expected rate of return. A
beta of greater than 1.00 suggests that, on average, the
returns of an asset are more volatile, more risky, and likely
to produce a greater return than the market portfolio when the
market increases. If, for instance, a stock has a beta of
1.30, the stock can be expected, on average, to increase 30
percent more than the market portfolio when the market
increases. The opposite occurs when the market goes down.
Stocks with beta's greater than 1.00 are called "aggressive"
securities. (Gup, 1984, p. 134)
In contrast, a beta less than 1.00 implies that the
returns on a stock are less volatile, less risky, and will
produce, on average, less return than the market portfolio.
Stocks with betas less than 1.00 are called "defensive"
securities. A beta of zero means that a security's returns
are not subject to systematic risk. (Gup, 1984, p. 134) The
following example (using ex post data) shows how the rate of
return is calculated for a stock with a beta of 1.3 when the
risk free rate is 10 percent and the market return is 25
percent.
Rj - i + (II - i) (Beta)
= .10 + (.25 - .10) (1.30)
= .295
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Therefore, the return on stock j, under the conditions stated




Using the methodology discussed in the previous chapter,
the hypothesis stated in Chapter I was tested. This chapter
reports the results of the tests for each company analyzed.
The thesis attempted to capture the financial atmosphere
during the time surrounding the contract award by reviewing
all available news and stock price information.
When stating the hypothesis it was expected that insiders
could outperform the market if they bought or sold their
company's stock prior to a favorable (unfavorable) contract
announcement by the company. The hypothesis is restated as
follows:







Rj = rate of return on security;
^ = rate of return on the S&P 500 index.
This chapter is divided into four sections with each
section looking at a specific company. Each section is broken
down into two subsections. The first subsection presents and
analyzes the data, questioning all possible explanations for
abnormalities within the data. The second subsection provides




On September 2, 1993 at 6:14 p.m. the company was
awarded an initial $265 million contract by the U.S. Navy for
construction of one strategic sealift ship. The contract also
contained options for another five ships that would raise the
overall value of the contract to $1.3 billion through 2001.
The shipbuilding orders were badly needed for Avondale which
had seen its backlog shrink to only 18 months as overall sales
slid from $777 million in 1991 to $592 million in 1992.
(Holzer, 1993, p. 4)
The importance of the contract is readily apparent in
that the $265 million award represented 45% of 1992 total
sales. It could be expected that the price of the stock would
be trending higher in the 30 days prior to the announcement if
individuals were taking advantage of the non-public informa-
tion regarding the contract.
Figure 5-1 summarizes the individual stock price data
along with the S&P 500 index during the 30 days leading up to
the contract announcement. From the price data in Figure 5-1
it is evident that Avondale did not produce an abnormal return
for the 30 days leading up to the award. The stock actually
earned a negative 2.703% return during the period versus
2.444% for S&P 500. There was no published news or situation
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Avondale vs. S&P 500
of any type during the time leading up to the award that might
have negatively effected the stock which might have hidden
insider buying during the period. Since the data refutes the
hypothesis that abnormal returns were achieved on the basis of
insider information, it was not necessary to address the
subsidiary questions addressed in the thesis.
One interesting note that accompanies the data as seen
vividly in Figure 5-1 is that the stock price went up 58.3% to
7 1/8 the day following the announcement which had been made
at 6:17 p.m. This price movement illustrates the importance
of the contract award.
2. Conclusions
As stated earlier, there was no abnormal return in
Avondale' s stock during the thirty days prior to the contract
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award. The lack of movement by the stock prior to the
announcement of a contract with such magnitude to the company
would lend support to the semi-strong form market hypothesis.
Recall, the semi-strong form hypothesis states that all past
and public information is adjusted for in security prices and
that public announcements are quickly impounded into the
security price, eliminating any abnormal profits from the
information.
The data seems to support that the information flow




On July 29, 1993 at 7:33 a.m. the company reported
that its government contract unit, Foundation Health Federal
Services Inc. , had been notified by the Department of Defense
that it was not selected to continue as the contractor for the
follow-on CHAMPUS Reform Initiative program in California and
Hawaii. The contract was for medical care management for
840,000 military retirees and their dependents in California
and Hawaii. The contract accounts for 45 percent of Founda-
tion's $1.5 billion in revenue and a comparable amount of its
61.9 million in profits. (Barnum, 1993, p. Dl)
In view of the extremely negative news, the stock
price would have been in a downward trend if information
leakage on the contract award was taking place. Figure 5-2
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summarizes the individual stock price data along with the S&P




Foundation Health vs. S&P 500
The price of the stock was trending upward when
information leakage would dictate a negative bias especially
during a slight decline in the market during this period.
Once again, abnormal returns were nowhere to be found in the
thirty days prior to the loss of the contract. Although one
interesting piece of information did come out in the course of
research. Several of the registered insider's of the company
sold amounts of their stock in May, only two months prior to
the loss of the contract.
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Kurt Davis, Director of Investor Relations at Founda-
tion Health, said the Foundation officers sold stock in recent
months because it was their first opportunity to do so since
August 1992 and because they believed that the window of
opportunity to sell shares would soon be closed again.
When negotiations began on the acquisition of
California Compensation Insurance Co. of Novato last year,
Foundation officers were constrained from selling because they
had inside information about the deal, Davis said.
Only when the deal became public on April 12, did the
officers have a chance to sell. And because of "the way this
company was growing with acquisitions, it was hard to tell"
when the window of opportunity to sell stock would be closed
again, Davis said. (Barnum, 1993, p. Dl)
On the day of the announcement as seen in Figure 5-2,
the stock of the company plunged 3 5 percent. Again, the price
movement of the stock illustrated the importance of the loss
of the contract in the market evaluation of the company.
2. Conclusion
Abnormal returns were not found within the data. The
explanation from investor relations at Foundation Health
regarding the selling of stock by registered insider's seems
reasonable and adequate justification. The analysis of the
data seems to support the semi-strong market hypothesis.
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D. AETNA LIFE & CASUALTY
1. Data Presentation/Analysis
On July 29, 1993 at 7:33 a.m. the company was awarded
a $3.5 billion contract for providing health care to about
800,000 military retirees and dependents in California and
Hawaii in the CHAMPUS Reform Initiative program. (McCoy,
1993, p. Al)
The contract would represent 20.59 percent of the
nearly $17 billion in revenue for the company in the last 12
months ending June 30, 1993.
A positive trend in the stock price would be expected
in the days leading up to the contract award if individuals
were taking advantage of the non-public information regarding
the contract. Table 5-1 summarizes the individual stock price
data along with the S&P 500 index data during the 3 days
leading up to the contract announcement.
TABLE 5-1










Using the capital asset pricing model with the risk
free 90-day T-Bill rate being 3 percent and a beta coefficient
for Aetna of 1.26, a risk adjusted return for Aetna was
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computed to be 4.951 percent versus the S&P 500 index. This
is a significant return which would indicate some abnormality.
Thus, further research was done to find possible causes for
the abnormality. The following computations illustrate the
calculation of the risk adjusted return.























- = Aj + (Beta) (R„ - i) + U;
t = the number of days from the date of purchase or sale
to the day for which the return is to be computed;
1^ = the equivalent return on the market index;
R. = the equivalent annual return on security i after t
days
;
P = the security price at 3 days prior to announcement;
P
t
= the security price after 30 days;
M
o
= the market index at 30 days prior to announcement;
M
t
= the market index after 30 days;
Aj = the excess return by the insider above the return on
the market;
U, = the error term with an expected value equal to zero.
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News reports were analyzed during the timeframe of the
award. One of the news items during the period was the
quarterly earnings announcement. Two days following the
contract award Aetna reported second quarter 1993 results of
a profit of $1.32 versus a loss of $.41 for the second quarter
1992. This was an outstanding report and was a surprise to
Wall Street. Institutional Brokerage Estimate Service (IBES)
had a mean estimate of $1.09 for the quarter. IBES is a
service which pools earnings estimates of equity analysts from
over 60 brokerage houses which operate on Wall Street.
The actual earnings report was 21.1 percent higher
than the mean estimate available to the street. The higher
than expected earnings report could certainly be categorized
as a positive surprise in the results of the company.
The last research indicator used was the buying and
selling by registered insiders. The online Corporate Owner-
ship Watch Service by Invest/Net Inc. on the Dow Jones News
Retrieval Online Service was reviewed for all the registered
insider transactions for 12 days leading up to the contract
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award. No unusual activity was uncovered with only a few
insider buys and sells taking place which were small and
offset each other.
Unlike the previous two companies, the price of the
stock of Aetna as seen in Figure 5-3, did not rise signifi-
cantly after the announcement of the contract award. It rose
only 3.9 percent from 57 3/4 to 60 and hovered around 58 1/2
for the five days following the announcement.
Figure 5-3
Aetna vs. 8&P 500
2. Conclusion
There appeared to be some abnormal returns achieved
from Aetna during the period which may indicate information
leakage. The corresponding above average earning announcement
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could significantly effect the results and may prove to be an
explanation of the abnormality.
Significant research has been previously conducted,
which indicates that when companies report earnings above the
consensus estimate of market analysts, their stocks achieve
above average returns. (Fosback, 1992, p. 205) Additionally,
research also indicates that abnormal returns have been earned
from insider purchases prior to higher than expected earnings
announcements. (Moss, 1986, p. 104)
From these past studies one could reasonably hypothe-
size that at least a portion of the abnormal return could be
attributed to the higher than expected earnings announcement.
It is a well known fact on Wall Street that the price of a
stock tends to increase for 2-3 weeks prior to a positive
earnings announcement. The street maxim of "Buy the rumor,
sell the fact" might very well be true in this case.
Additionally, transaction costs of approximately 2
percent on both the buy and sale side would almost offset any
abnormal returns. Finally, there was no persuasive evidence
to support the hypothesis that abnormal returns were being
made with inside information on the contract award.
E. TADIRAN LIMITED
1. Data Presentation/Analysis
On September 7, 1993 at 12:21 p.m. the company
announced a $4 M supply pact with U.S. armed forces to supply
10,000 additional SINCGARS tactical communication radios.
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Tadiran is an Israeli based telecommunications defense and
consumer appliance conglomerate. (Dow Jones News, September
8, 1993) The contract would represent 25.87 percent of
current year military sales.
A positive trend in the stock price would be expected
in the days leading up to the contract award if information
leakage was occurring. Table 5-2 and Figure 5-4 summarize the
individual stock price data along with the S&P 500 index data
during the 30 days leading up to the contract award.
The excess return achieved by Tadiran in relation to
the S&P 500 Index was 2 6.86 percent. There was no beta
coefficient available to adjust the return for risk. The beta
was unavailable due to the company being a foreign stock and
have only been traded on New York Stock Exchange for a
TABLE 5-2






Tadiran 27.5 35.325 28.636%
S&P 500 Index 448.68 456.65 1.776%
little over a year. This is a significant return which could
indicate some abnormality. Thus, further research was done to
find possible causes for the abnormality. The calculation of
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the return for Tadiran was 28.636% versus 1.776% for the S&P
500 index.
To determine possible causal factors, news reports
during the timeframe of the award were reviewed and analyzed.
One major news announcement during the time period was the
signing of a historic peace agreement between Israel and the
Palestine Liberation Organization. Some mutual fund experts
predicted that peace in the Middle East could open the door
for new funds or for established international funds to add
Israeli securities to their portfolios. (Romano, 1993)
Therefore, an investigation of other Israeli stocks
was warranted. Figures 5-5, 5-6, and 5-7 illustrate the stock
movement of Tadiran, PEC Israel, and the First Israel Fund
during the time period of the award.
Figure 5-4
Tadiran vs. S&P 500
43
ire-n tv\TTt M.-a^i.w-'n.^i w g
Figure 5-5
PEC Israel vs. S&P 500
Figure 5-6
First Israel Fund vs. S&P 500
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Tadiran 27.5 35.325 28.636%
S&P 500 Index 448.68 456.65 1.776%
PEC Israel Economic Corp. is a New York-based holding
company with investments in various Israeli industries. First
Israel Fund Inc. is a closed-end mutual fund which invests in
Israeli companies.
These two stocks provided a good measure of Israel
stocks in general due to their diversified investment struc-
ture. The lack of an established Israel stock index within
the U.S. increases the importance of analyzing the returns of
these two stocks.
Table 5-3 identifies that the Israeli stock market was
rapidly moving upward during the time of the contract award.
This rapid movement in Israeli stocks was the only reasonable
explanation found within the research for Tadiran 's impressive
return during this time period.
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2. Conclusion
Tadiran definitely achieved an abnormal return during
the time period. The research indicated that this return
probably corresponded to the boom in the Israeli stock market
during the period as a result of the peace accord. No conclu-
sive evidence could be found which supports that the abnormal
returns were the result of information leakage.
46
VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The purpose of the thesis was to examine government
contractor stock activity prior to contract award announce-
ments to determine if insider inequalities may have occurred.
The thesis examined four defense industry companies to
determine if insiders trade on non-public information to earn
above average returns based on contract awards. Stock price
data for the 3 days leading up to the award was closely
scrutinized. The analysis included reviewing registered
insider transactions, related company stock movement and
earnings announcements. All available news data was also
analyzed to provide background and any causal relationships to
any abnormality.
B. CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis, two of the companies analyzed, Avondale
Industries and Foundation Health, operated at the semi -strong
form of the market hypothesis. They showed no abnormal
returns for the 3 days leading up to the contract award.
However, there was a sharp rise in abnormal returns on the
date of the announcement with a corresponding increase in the
trading volume for that day. The market quickly absorbed this




The other two companies analyzed in the thesis, Aetna Life
and Casualty and Tadiran, did display some abnormal returns.
However, the abnormal returns appeared to be in response to a
surprise positive earnings announcement and a strong sector
rally rather than directly to the contract award.
From the analysis of the few companies picked, it can be
concluded that abnormal returns were not achieved as a result
of information leakage in the preceding 3 days leading up to
a major defense contract award.
The' contract award process within the defense industry
appeared to be effective in these cases with no apparent flaws
within the information flow. The current regulations
regarding trading based on insider information monitored by
the Securities and Exchange Commission also seems to be
effective.
Therefore, it appeared that the current system is working.
Although abnormal returns may be still achieved with inside
information on a small scale basis, additional enforcement
measures may not be warranted.
The Foundation Health and Aetna examples in this thesis
support- the conclusion proposed by Czech, where the study
found that abnormal returns were not achieved by registered
insiders prior to major contract awards. (Czech, 1989, p. 75)
Also the Foundation Health and Aetna examples contradict
the work of Moss, where it was found that registered insiders
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did achieve abnormal return from trading on inside information
prior to contract awards. (Moss, 1986, p. 106)
C . RECOMMENDATIONS
1. It is recommended that when abnormal stock movement
prior to contract awards is identified, other possible
sources for the movement should be investigated
including all available financial news, market news, and
political announcements. The investigation should help
separate other causal factors from insider trading
effects
.
2. It is recommended that the methodology used in this
thesis be reviewed for applicability to future SEC or
Department of Defense investigations into possible
illegal trading patterns within the defense industries.
3. The results of this thesis suggest the following areas
for further study:
a. It is recommended that the methodology of this
thesis be expanded to include all defense contract
awards representing five percent or more of sales
in the last three years. The results from this
thesis could then be compared for consistency with
a larger population of defense contract awards.
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b. It is recommended that a replication of this thesis
also be conducted across commercial industries to
provide insight as to whether abnormal returns are
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